# Deprecate the FiRM Fed Global Ceiling

**URL:** <https://forum.inverse.finance/t/deprecate-the-firm-fed-global-ceiling/623>\
**Category:** FiRM\
**Created:** [November 12, 2025, 3:39pm UTC](https://forum.inverse.finance/t/deprecate-the-firm-fed-global-ceiling/623 "2025-11-12T15:39:16Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 1\
**Page:** 1

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![cryptoharry](https://sea1.discourse-cdn.com/inverse/user_avatar/forum.inverse.finance/cryptoharry/32/22_2.png) [@cryptoharry](https://forum.inverse.finance/u/cryptoharry)\
**Post date:** [November 12, 2025, 3:39pm UTC](https://forum.inverse.finance/t/deprecate-the-firm-fed-global-ceiling/623/1 "2025-11-12T15:39:17Z")

</div>

# Proposal to Deprecate the FiRM Fed Global Ceiling

## TL;DR

- What: Raise the FiRM Fed’s global supply ceiling to a practically non-binding level so it no longer constrains operations.
- Why: The global ceiling adds little risk control beyond per-market ceilings, but it does create operational friction (hard caps on idle liquidity).

## Background

The [FiRM Fed](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2b34548b865ad66a2b046cb82e59ee43f75b90fd#code) mints/burns DOLA into approved FiRM markets. In `expansion()`, two checks gate supply:

- Global: `globalSupply + amount <= supplyCeiling`
- Per-market: `supplies[market] + amount <= ceilings[market]`

Other relevant guardrails:

- Only the chair can call expansion/contraction; only gov can change ceilings/chair.
- Expansion is blocked if a market is paused (`borrowPaused()` check).
- Only whitelisted markets (`dbr.markets(address(market))`) can be targeted.

Note: Raising the global ceiling does not mint DOLA. It only relaxes the aggregate cap. All per-market ceilings remain fully binding.

## Motivation

The global ceiling has become an operational constraint without adding material risk control:

- It prevents leaving healthy idle DOLA in lower-utilization markets (e.g., ETH-collateral markets) even when per-market ceilings are conservative. That can deter new borrowers who want to see available liquidity before opening positions.
- Risk is already budgeted at the market level via `ceilings[market]`. Those limits are what actually shape exposure and are the knobs we tune as collateral, liquidity, and oracle conditions evolve.
- The global ceiling introduces a “sum of all markets” choke point that we repeatedly trip on, not for risk reasons (e.g., juggling liquidity between markets).

By setting the global ceiling to a very high value, we effectively deprecate it while keeping all per-market ceilings and existing checks intact. This high value is proposed to be 100 billion DOLA.

## What Changes vs. What Stays the Same

- Stays: Per-market ceilings (primary risk limit), borrow-pause check, chair-only control, and ability to contract supply at any time.
- Changes: The global ceiling no longer binds day-to-day operations; the Fed Chair can pre-fund markets up to their individual ceilings without tripping an aggregate cap.

## On-Chain Action

- Set FiRM Fed’s global ceiling to 100,000,000,000 DOLA