This proposal seeks to increase the threshold for governance quorum from 9,500 to 15,250 votes. A higher threshold will help ensure high proposal quality and safeguard the DAO against governance attacks in time’s of weak markets.
Background
The DAO will soon be voting on a proposal to increase circulating supply titled: H2 2023 INV Mint Proposal. This change in supply warrants an updated governance quorum to reflect 5% of circulating supply (15,250 votes). The submit proposal requirements will be kept unchanged at 1,900 votes.
Important to note that DAO Governance has consistently shown good health with 16 of the last 20 proposals receiving over 15,250 for votes.
In the future would love to see some exploration into how to most accurately set the threshold. The top delegate can win all votes with only 4 wallets delegating to themselves.
Additionally, exploring mechanisms to increase participation would be interesting, most votes don’t get that many voters, I for example didn’t vote on the pictured item (which got six voters) because it was effectively already decided, I would have voted yes but nonetheless it may be good to explore (or better surface) the way that stakers of INV can voice their opinion.
All the above said, will vote yes on this proposal.
Agree with all of your points, I’ve actually raised similar points internally surrounding our concentration of voting power. From a risk perspective I would feel better with a little breathing room until we can explore ways to encourage more voter participation and or delegations.
“Agree quorum should be raised but 4% (12,200) may be more appropriate. The 5% figure was designed with a max total supply of 120k when all the distributed INV was in the hands of active voters. We can assume this isn’t the case anymore with INV not being migrated from old contracts and “Dead INV” in inactive wallets over the years.”
It’s a good point that we should explore ways to encourage more voting and can probably be an initiative of the Community Working Group. As it stands there are a few options I had in mind…
-Incentivize voters directly, paid monthly
-Include each proposal voter into a raffle that draws an INV reward monthly (1 ticket per proposal)
-Incentivize INV holders to delegate to active delegates and possibly incentivize active delegates
Rewarding voters and delegates is an appealing thought but it introduces new bias in the voting dynamics. Quality is more important than mass participation imo and even small rewards could encourage someone patient enough to game the system, or to participate without engaging with the context of the votes.
